The current tendency to moderate expectations that DNA barcode can be a method of discovering new species is due to the essentialist interpretation of this scientific analogy that is conceptually unsustainable. Something similar has happened in the philosophical field with the weakening of the initial versions of intrinsic biological essentialism. To examine the nature of this transition, I propose two principles that define a moderate EBI: one that assumes that the history of the taxon is metaphysically dependent on the evolution (...) of its intrinsic properties and another that assumes the necessary coextensivity between the intrinsic properties that explain the phenotype of the species and the bearers of identity conditions of a species. I argue that both principles are conceptually and empirically unsatisfactory. (shrink)

The current tendency to moderate expectations that DNA barcode can be a method of discovering new species is due to the essentialist interpretation of this scientific analogy that is conceptually unsustainable. Something similar has happened in the philosophical field with the weakening of the initial versions of intrinsic biological essentialism. To examine the nature of this transition, I propose two principles that define a moderate EBI: one that assumes that the history of the taxon is metaphysically dependent on the evolution (...) of its intrinsic properties and another that assumes the necessary coextensivity between the intrinsic properties that explain the phenotype of the species and the bearers of identity conditions of a species. I argue that both principles are conceptually and empirically unsatisfactory. (shrink)

RESUMENMe propongo examinar críticamente la analogía entre selección natural y condicionamiento operante que Fodor y Piattelli-Palmarini utilizan para sostener que los mismos argumentos que desacreditan la teoría conductista desacreditan la teoría de la selección natural. Estas teorías no son independientes ni conceptual ni históricamente y, por eso, no es razonable hacer una analogía entre ambas con las intenciones que se proponen Fodor y Piattelli-Palmarini. La selección natural es una condición causal del me­ca­nismo de condicionamiento operante, motivo por el cual la (...) refutación de la teoría del condicio­na­miento no puede ser una razón para la refutación de la teoría de la selección natural. ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue against the analogy between natural selection and operant conditioning that Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini used to argue that the same arguments that discredit the behaviorist theory discredit the theory of natural selection. These theories are not independent either conceptually or historically and, therefore, it is unreasonable to make an analogy between selection and operant conditioning that can serve Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini's intentions. Natural selection is a causal condition of the mechanism of operant conditioning, so the refutation of the theory of operant conditioning cannot be a reason for the refutation of the theory of natural selection. (shrink)